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Constitutional Amendment After the 
Senate Reference and the 
Prospects for Electoral Reform 
Michael Pal 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The new federal government committed that 2015 would be the last 
election1 under the first past the post (“FPTP”) system used since 1867.2 
If the federal electoral system does change, it will be a break from the 
recent politics of reform. Over the last decade, numerous attempts to 
reform provincial electoral systems have failed.3 The additional potential 
hurdle facing the federal government, which was not relevant for the 
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University of Ottawa. I would like to thank Ben Berger and Sonia Lawrence for the invitation to 
present at the Constitutional Cases Conference and Adam Dodek, Jon Penney, Richard Albert, 
Emmett Macfarlane, Carissima Mathen, Vanessa MacDonnell, Peter Oliver, B. Thomas Hall, 
Yasmin Dawood, Peter Hogg, Kate Glover, Jonathan Rose, Nathalie DesRosiers, Grégoire Webber 
and Dwight Newman for helpful discussions on this topic or comments on earlier versions of the 
article. Thanks to Catarina Ferreira for excellent research assistance and the anonymous reviewers of 
the Supreme Court Law Review for constructive comments. 
1 Rosemary Barton, “Justin Trudeau Votes to End 1st-Past-the-Post Voting in Platform 
Speech”, CBC News (June 16, 2015). As of the time of writing, the House of Commons Committee 
tasked with studying reform options has not yet produced its report. 
2 On the use of FPTP in Canada, or as it is also known “single member plurality” (“SMP”), 
see Louis Massicotte, “Electoral Reform in Canada” in André Blais, ed., To Keep or to Change First 
Past the Post?: The Politics of Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 112; 
Henry Milner, ed., Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada 
and its Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Dennis Pilon, Wrestling with 
Democracy: Voting Systems as Politics in the Twentieth Century West (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2013); and Elections Canada, A History of the Right to Vote in Canada (Ottawa: 
Elections Canada, 2007) [hereinafter “Elections Canada, ‘History of the Right to Vote’”]. 
3 Mark E. Warren & Hillary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Patrick Fournier et 
al., When Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Lawrence Leduc, “Electoral Reform and Direct Democracy in Canada: 
When Citizens Become Involved” (2011) 34:3 West European Politics 551. 
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provinces, is the uncertainty relating to the rules on constitutional 
amendment, particularly in light of the Reference re Senate Reform.4  
The central questions I address in this article are whether federal 
electoral reform requires recourse to the formal amendment rules in Part V 
of the Constitution Act, 19825 and, if so, whether provincial consent is 
required. Canada famously has one of the democratic world’s most rigid 
regimes for constitutional amendment.6 If electoral reform requires 
provincial consent, then it is likely dead on arrival. While it is formally 
possible to amend the Constitution even where federal-provincial 
agreement is obligatory, it is likely to be constructively unamendable7 in 
the absence of a new round of mega-constitutional negotiations.8  
There has always been some lack of clarity regarding the constitutional 
status of the electoral system, with two main traditional possibilities. The 
electoral system could be understood as a classic unwritten constitutional 
convention changeable through regular federal legislation, or as requiring 
a formal amendment under Parliament’s authority in section 44 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.9 In either scenario, Parliament could enact reform 
unilaterally.  
The Senate Reference raises doubts about the validity of both of these 
options for unilateral federal reform. It expands the scope of constitutional 
changes to which Part V applies and makes provincial consent the default 
rule for constitutional amendment. The Senate Reference generates 
significant uncertainty as to whether Parliament can meaningfully alter 
federal institutions without provincial consent,10 including but not limited 
                                                                                                                                  
4 [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reference”]. 
5 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 
1982”]. 
6 Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 53:1 
Alberta L. Rev. 85 [hereinafter “Albert, ‘Constitutional Amendment’”]. 
7 Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States” (2014) 
67 S.C.L.R. 181. 
8 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People, 
3d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Russell”]. On the Senate Reference 
and mega-constitutional politics, see Adam M. Dodek, “The Politics of the Senate Reform 
Reference: Fidelity, Frustration and Federal Unilateralism” (2015) 60:4 McGill L.J. 623. 
9 I leave a discussion of the electoral reform and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”] for another day. 
10 See Adam M. Dodek, “Uncovering the Wall Surrounding the Castle of the Constitution: 
Judicial Interpretation of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed., 
Constitutional Amendment in Canada: The Law and Politics of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming] [hereinafter “Dodek, ‘Uncovering the Wall’”]; 
Emmett Macfarlane, “Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of 
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to electoral reform. Electoral reform now rests on uncertain constitutional 
ground as a consequence.  
This article proceeds as follows. Section II analyzes the reasoning in 
the Senate Reference, in order to establish the baseline rules for when 
unilateral Parliamentary action is permitted and when provincial consent 
is mandated. Section III assesses the broader constitutional implications 
of the Senate Reference. It investigates what zones of certainty and 
uncertainty exist with regard to constitutional change and the main 
institutions of the federal government. Electoral reform lives squarely 
within the constitutional grey zone produced by the Senate Reference. 
Section IV outlines the considerations relevant to whether the formal 
amendment procedures apply to electoral reform. Section V considers 
what reforms can be achieved by Parliament alone, if electoral system 
change is deemed to constitute a Part V amendment. I conclude that on 
the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, there is legitimate 
uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of unilateral federal action 
introducing a mixed member proportional (“MMP”)11 or proportional 
representation (“PR”) system. A ranked ballot, however, likely stands on 
firmer constitutional ground.  
II. THE SENATE REFERENCE 
1. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Part V  
The Senate Reference put a break on reform of the Upper House, by 
declaring that Parliament alone cannot abolish the Senate or alter its 
fundamental features. The Court found that abolition would amend Part V 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and therefore requires unanimous consent.12 
Consultative elections would shift the “method of selecting” Senators, 
which requires provincial agreement from at least seven provinces with 
                                                                                                             
Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 60:4 McGill L.J. 883 [hereinafter “Macfarlane”]; and 
Yasmin Dawood, “The Senate Reference: Constitutional Change and Democracy” (2015) 60:4 
McGill L.J. 737 [hereinafter “Dawood”]. For a more optimistic take that understands the Court to 
have provided important guidance, see Kate Glover, “Complexity and the Amending Formula” 
(2015) 24:2 Constitutional Forum 9. 
11 The Law Commission of Canada proposed MMP: Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for 
Canada (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2004). 
12 Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 5, at s. 41. 
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50 per cent of the population (the “7/50” formula).13 Term limits are also 
possible only through a 7/50 amendment. The property qualifications for 
membership in the Senate14 can be repealed pursuant to Parliament’s 
unilateral authority in section 44, except for Quebec Senators.15 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court developed a method of 
constitutional interpretation that potentially expands the range of matters 
captured by Part V. Silence in the text about a particular matter does not 
imply in the Court’s understanding that changes to it can be made outside 
of Part V. Whenever the “fundamental nature or role”16 of a central 
institution would be modified or the “constitutional architecture”17 would 
be affected by federal action, the formal amending procedures kick in. 
The Court puts its approach succinctly:  
The concept of an “amendment to the Constitution of Canada”, within 
the meaning of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, is informed by the 
nature of the Constitution and its rules of interpretation. As discussed, 
the Constitution should not be viewed as a mere collection of discrete 
textual provisions. It has an architecture, a basic structure. By 
extension, amendments to the Constitution are not confined to textual 
changes. They include changes to the Constitution’s architecture.18 
As a consequence of this approach, the formal amendment rules 
might potentially apply to electoral reform, even in the absence of any 
direct reference to FPTP in the text generally, or in Part V itself. The 
Court compels us to ask whether any proposed reform of the electoral 
system would alter the constitutional architecture19 or fundamentally 
change the basic institutions of the state? If the answer to either question 
is “yes”, then Part V applies.  
                                                                                                                                  
13 Section 42(1)(b) imposes the 7/50 rule on changes to Senatorial selection. The 7/50 rule 
comes from s. 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
14 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, 
No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”], at s. 23(3). 
15 Quebec’s consent is required pursuant to s. 43, as it would amend the rules in s. 23(6) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, which relate to a single province. 
16 Senate Reference, supra, note 4, at paras. 48, 52, 69, 75, 77-79, 87-88 and 90-91. The 
Court uses the terms “fundamental nature or role” and “fundamental nature and role” (emphasis 
added) interchangeably. 
17 Id., at para. 60. 
18 Id., at para. 27. 
19 On the architecture concept, see Warren J. Newman, “Of Castles and Living Trees: The 
Metaphorical Structural Constitution” (2015) 9 J.P.P.L. 471. 
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2. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Section 44  
Even if a matter is treated as triggering Part V, the possibility of 
unilateral federal action remains. Section 44 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 permits Parliament to “make laws amending the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate 
and House of Commons”. Parliament’s space to manoeuver unilaterally 
is scarce, however, as the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of 
section 44 in the Senate Reference. The Court read section 44 in relation 
to the procedures requiring provincial consent and in light of its view of 
7/50 as the default rule for amendment.20  
The Court reasoned that in a federation “substantial provincial 
consent must be obtained for constitutional change that engages provincial 
interests”.21 Section 44 is an “exception”22 to the general procedure, 
“limited” in scope,23 and can only apply to measures “which do not 
engage the interests of the other level of government”.24 Only if 
“provincial interests”25 are not engaged and the “fundamental nature and 
role”26 of the House or Senate remains untouched can section 44 be 
invoked. This narrow construal of section 44 is consistent with the 
Court’s view of the precursor provision that existed before 1982.27 The 
Court had few direct applications of the provision to draw upon as 
section 44 has only been invoked three times: to amend the formula that 
determines how many seats each province is apportioned in the House,28 
                                                                                                                                  
20 An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, S.C. 1996, c. 1 (the “Regional Veto Act”) 
provides a veto to provinces or regions over constitutional amendments that require 7/50. See 
Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, “The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada’s 
Constitutional Amendment Process” (1997) 30:2 C.J.P.S. 339. Macfarlane, supra, note 10, at 902 
and Albert, “Constitutional Amendment”, supra, note 6, at 97-98 argue it may be unconstitutional. 
21 Senate Reference, supra, note 4, at para. 34. 
22 Id., at para. 75. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., at para. 48; See Warren J. Newman, “Putting One’s Faith in a Higher Power: Supreme 
Law, The Senate Reform Reference, Legislative Authority and the Amending Procedures” (2015) 34:2 
N.J.C.L. 99. Newman argues Parliament still has important powers in s. 44. Andrew Heard, “Tapping 
the Potential of Senate-Driven Reform: Proposals to Limit the Powers of the Senate” (2015) 24:2 
Constitutional Forum 47 argues that significant reforms to the Senate remain achievable. 
25 Senate Reference, supra, note 4, at paras. 29, 34 and 67 among others. 
26 Id., at paras. 48 and 75. 
27 Re Upper House, [1979] S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.). Peter Hogg critiques 
that case for narrowly interpreting the unilateral federal power of amendment with regard to the 
Senate: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at 4-32 
[hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Constitutional Law’”] and “Comment” (1980) 58 Can. Bar Rev. 631. 
28 Hogg, “Constitutional Law”, supra, note 27, at 1-7; Warren J. Newman, “Defining the 
‘Constitution of Canada’ Since 1982: The Scope of the Legislative Powers of Constitutional 
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in the Representation Act, 198529 and the Fair Representation Act,30 and 
to constitute Nunavut as a territory.31  
The Court’s generous interpretation of “provincial interests” appears 
to leave little room for unilateral federal action. The Court explicitly 
adopted a “stakeholder” understanding of provincial interests.32 It views 
the provinces as stakeholders in the federal institutions that they rely upon 
for representation in Ottawa, including their “constitutional design”.33  
The treatment of term limits in the Senate Reference demonstrates 
just how readily the Court was prepared to deem provincial interests to 
be engaged. The Court rejected terms imposed by Parliament as undue 
restrictions on the Senate’s function as the body of “sober second 
thought”.34 That term limits would seriously alter the Senate has been 
critiqued, especially as Senators do not on average serve lengthy terms.35 
The implication is that the institution would not be transformed by term 
limits, unless exceedingly short. Yet the Court still found that provincial 
interests would be engaged for shifting a long-standing feature of the 
Senate.36 The Senate Reference considers the provinces to have a stake in 
preserving the significant institutional elements of the status quo agreed 
to in 1867 and continuing to today, such as term limits, though it viewed 
property qualifications as too remote from the core provincial interests.  
The interpretation of the Senate Reference as adopting a generous 
view of provincial interests is buttressed by the reasoning in the 
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6.37 The Supreme Court 
Reference contained a similar move to the Senate Reference, though 
                                                                                                             
Amendment Under Sections 44 and 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (2003) 22 S.C.L.R. 423, at 429 
[hereinafter “Newman, ‘Defining the ‘Constitution’’”]. 
29 S.C. 1986, c. 8. 
30 S.C. 2011, c. 26. 
31 Newman, “Defining the ‘Constitution’”, supra, note 28. 
32 The Court uses this term on three occasions: Senate Reference, supra, note 4, at paras. 48, 
77 and 82. 
33 See id., at para. 77 (“stakeholders in our constitutional design”) and similar language in 
para. 82. Dennis Pilon argues that electoral reform does not engage provincial interests: “You Can’t 
Hide Behind the Constitution to Spare Us Electoral Reform”, National Post (February 1, 2016) 
[hereinafter “Pilon”]. His argument does not take into account the “stakeholder” understanding of 
provincial interests used by the Court. 
34 Senate Reference, id., at para. 79. 
35 Peter W. Hogg, “Senate Reform and the Constitution” (2015) 68 S.C.L.R. 591, at 600-602 
[hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Senate Reform’”]; Macfarlane, supra, note 10, at 894-98. The Senate Reference 
considered term limits of 9, 12 and 15 years. 
36 Senate Reference, supra, note 4, at para. 82. 
37 [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Reference”]. 
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anchored in the constitutional text related to the judiciary. Only with 
provincial consent can Parliament alter the “essential features” of the 
Court, even though most are not listed in Part V.38  
The central benefit of the Court’s approach in the two cases is that it 
sets a clear line preventing illegitimate amendments39 by the federal 
government to the underlying constitutional order, or basic structure.40 
The Court has set itself up as the guardian of constitutional amendment,41 
with the task of scrutinizing the details of reforms to central institutions. 
The Court’s method protects the foundational institutions of the federal 
state, even if the constitutional text does not explicitly do so. The trade-
off in this approach, however, is a reduction of flexibility. No matter how 
badly needed, reform of the defining features of central institutions may 
be stymied, because their long-standing presence has imbued them with 
enhanced constitutional status.42  
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM  
OF FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Senate Reference generated considerable uncertainty regarding both 
what is captured by the formal rules on amendment in Part V and, if they are 
engaged, when provincial consent will be required. The vagueness of the 
phrase “constitutional architecture”, the malleability of the term 
“fundamental nature and role”, and the potentially vast reach of “provincial 
interests” all contribute to destabilizing the constitutional ground.  
It is an open question how influential the reasoning in the Senate 
Reference will be in changes to other central institutions. It is possible  
to read the emphasis on provincial consent in the Senate Reference 
narrowly as pertaining only to the Senate and not to the other legislative 
chamber, the House of Commons. Such a reading, however, is undermined 
by the placement of both the Senate and the House within the same 
provision related to amendment, namely section 44. The adoption of a  
 
                                                                                                                                  
38 Id., at para. 74. 
39 See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth” (2015) 60:4 McGill L.J. 673, 
who warns of illegitimate amendments. 
40 See Joel I. Colon-Rios & Allan C. Hutchinson, “Constitutionalizing the Senate: A Modest 
Democratic Proposal” (2015) 60:4 McGill L.J. 599 and Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance and Spirit: 
Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the Senate Reform Reference” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221. 
41 Dawood, supra, note 10, points out this enhanced role at 750. 
42 Hogg, “Senate Reform”, supra, note 35, at 604. 
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similar test in the Supreme Court Reference also indicates that to read the 
Senate Reference narrowly as applying only to the Senate is to ignore 
larger trends at play in the Court’s jurisprudence. At this stage, we have no 
conclusive answers on the reach of the Senate Reference.  
We can establish some parameters, however, for constitutional 
amendment with regard to federal institutions. Applying the reasoning of 
the Senate Reference, some matters are covered by Part V and require 
provincial consent to alter. In this category we can place the existence of 
the central institutions of the federal government as well as their 
fundamental or essential features. The Senate and Supreme Court are 
protected from abolition without unanimous consent and changes to their 
core features require provincial agreement. If the Supreme Court and the 
Senate are part of the constitutional architecture, then we can reasonably 
conclude the House is as well.  
We can also glean a category of matters where Parliament clearly has 
unilateral authority to act, either because they are excluded from Part V or, 
if within the formal rules, can be achieved through section 44 for not 
engaging provincial interests. Insignificant features of a central institution 
can be changed by Parliament alone, either as non-constitutional matters or 
as falling under section 44. The Senate property qualifications are the clear 
example here, as amendable by section 44. Though often significant, the 
internal workings of Parliament protected by privilege would presumably 
be excluded from the formal rules on amendment.43  
Between these two islands of relative clarity, however, there is a vast 
zone of uncertainty. The grey zone includes institutions not in existence 
in 1867 or 1982, but which have arguably evolved to play fundamental 
roles. Adam Dodek points out the full range of institutions not 
traditionally considered as having constitutional status, but which may 
now fall under Part V and require provincial consent to alter.44 It is worth 
considering, he writes,45 whether on the Court’s view of section 44 
Officers of Parliament46 such as the Chief Electoral Officer47 or Auditor 
                                                                                                                                  
43 See Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] S.C.J. No. 28, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 
(S.C.C.) (on Parliamentary privilege). 
44 Dodek, “Uncovering the Wall”, supra, note 10. 
45 Id., at 11. 
46 On Officers, see Jeffrey Graham Bell, “Agents of Parliament: A New Branch of 
Government?” (2006) 29:1 Can. Parl. Rev. 13. 
47 On the constitutional role of election commissions, see Michael Pal, “Electoral 
Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government” Rev. Con. Studies (forthcoming 2016) and 
Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113(3) Harv. L. Rev. 633, at 691. 
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General may be outside of the scope of the unilateral federal authority. 
The evolution of the Supreme Court to ever-greater levels of importance 
dictated its constitutional status in the Supreme Court Reference. Similar 
logic could entrench the Chief Electoral Officer or other Officers beyond 
Parliament’s control.  
Also within the grey zone are constitutional conventions that affect 
the important features of core institutions. Conventions are parts of the 
Constitution and may define essential components of our system of 
government, but they can be altered by the practice of political actors 
and are not legally enforceable by the courts.48 Imagine, however, a 
government that sought to dramatically alter the convention of 
responsible government by moving to direct election of the Prime 
Minister by voters. The Court’s reasoning in the Senate Reference 
would potentially engage Part V for such a change, even if there was no 
amendment to the text, because it could be said to alter fundamental 
features of the House and executive as well as the constitutional 
architecture.  
I turn now to applying the approach in the Senate Reference to 
electoral reform. I conclude that on the reasoning in the Senate 
Reference, most important reforms of the FPTP electoral system should 
be placed squarely within the grey zone as well, until we have further 
elucidation from the Court on the reach of its doctrinal innovations.  
IV. DOES CHANGING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
REQUIRE A FORMAL AMENDMENT? 
1. First Past the Post 
The Senate Reference compels us to ask if the electoral system is 
part of the constitutional architecture, if changing it would alter the 
fundamental nature and role of the House, and whether provincial 
interests are engaged by reform. There are two49 main possible visions of  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
48 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 
753 (S.C.C.); Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
49 The third possibility is that it is a non-constitutional matter. For reasons of space and 
because it is the least plausible option, I do not engage with this issue. 
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the constitutional status of electoral reform: (a) it is an unwritten convention 
that can be altered by Parliament alone without engaging the amending 
formula at all, with the exception of the rules guaranteeing a minimum 
number of seats to the provinces; or (b) it is subject to the rules on formal 
amendment in Part V.  
The electoral system as inherited from the United Kingdom could be 
viewed as a constitutional convention.50 FPTP is not explicitly mentioned 
anywhere in the Constitution. FPTP is not spelled out in the constitutional 
documents, but is a long-standing practice that provides meaning to the 
text and fills in gaps between provisions. It has many of the classic 
features of a convention.  
Any federal reform would have to respect clear constitutional rules 
from the text guaranteeing the proportionate representation of the 
provinces51 and a minimum number of seats.52 As long as these are 
respected, a new electoral system could be implemented through federal 
legislation if the view of FPTP as a convention prevails. To adhere to 
these rules, Parliament could simply keep the number of seats assigned to 
each province the same, and make sure that any MPs elected from a list 
to ensure proportional representation would be tied to a particular 
province. Parliament would have a nearly free hand to design a new 
electoral system.53  
The method of constitutional interpretation adopted by the Court in 
the Senate Reference, however, directs us away from focusing on 
whether FPTP is a convention for the purposes of assessing whether a 
formal amendment is required. Instead we must consider whether it is 
part of the constitutional architecture. Given FPTP’s importance, the  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
50 There may be separate issues as to whether a particular aspect of an electoral system is 
compliant with s. 2(b) and/or s. 3 of the Charter. 
51 Section 52, Constitution Act, 1867. Campbell v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 
B.C.J. No. 442, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (B.C.C.A.) gave Parliament leeway to define “proportionate”. 
52 There are two minimum guarantees: The “Senate floor” and the “grandfather clause”. 
Both are incorporated into the “representation formula” in s. 51 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
The Senate floor is subject to amendment only through unanimous consent: s. 41(b), Constitution 
Act, 1982. 
53 Some legislative provisions indirectly imposing FPTP may need amendment to 
implement a new electoral system. Section 313(1) of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 
declares “the candidate who obtained the largest number of votes” to be the winner in a riding. 
Section 68(1) bars parties from nominating more than one candidate per riding. Various other 
provisions rest on the use of ridings. The Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1, s. 21 
prevents candidates from running in more than one riding. 
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Court’s approach seriously raises the possibility that the electoral system 
is subject to the rules on formal amendment in Part V of the Constitution 
Act, 1982.  
2. The Constitutional Architecture 
The most direct judicial pronouncements from which we can attempt 
to glean the constitutional status of the electoral system come from 
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).54 Figueroa struck down 
restrictions placed on small political parties under the right to vote. One 
possible implication after Figueroa was that FPTP was vulnerable to a 
section 3 challenge, since it consistently favours large political parties.55 
The majority, however, did not expressly consider the constitutional 
status of the electoral system. 
Justice LeBel’s concurrence did address FPTP and emphatically 
endorsed the electoral system as having deep constitutional significance. 
His concurrence planted a marker that the reasoning in Figueroa should 
not be used to invalidate FPTP in future constitutional litigation.56  
He wrote that while the Charter does not mandate a particular electoral 
system, FPTP has constitutional significance. He stated that “our [FPTP] 
electoral system is one of Canada’s core political institutions”.57 The 
concurrence reads like an ode to the virtues of FPTP.58  
Justice LeBel was careful to include caveats. He wrote that Parliament 
has wide leeway to design the electoral system and that the Constitution 
does not dictate which one.59 Yet these comments must be viewed in 
context. He was addressing only whether section 3 of the Charter required 
FPTP or a more proportional alternative. His concurrence is largely obiter 
as it has little direct connection to the provisions at issue in Figueroa.  
He appears to have been attempting to foreclose the Charter as an avenue 
by which to force a change in electoral system. 
                                                                                                                                  
54 [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Figueroa”] (Justice 
LeBel was joined by Gonthier J. and Deschamps J.). 
55 Daoust v. Quebec (Chief Electoral Officer), [2011] Q.J. No. 12526, [2011] R.J.Q. 1687 
(Q.C.C.A.). The constitutionality of FPTP was upheld. 
56 See Michael Pal, “The Promise and Limits of Citizens’ Assemblies: Deliberation, 
Institutions, and the Law of Democracy” (2012) 38:1 Queen’s L.J. 259, at 285-88 [hereinafter  
“Pal, ‘Citizen’s Assemblies’”] for a discussion of the implications. 
57 Figueroa, supra, note 54, at para. 157. 
58 Pal, “Citizen’s Assemblies”, supra, note 56, at 284-88. 
59 Figueroa, supra, note 54, at paras. 158, 161. 
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The debate between the majority and concurring opinions in 
Figueroa suggests that the constitutional value of FPTP remains 
unresolved. The emphasis on FPTP as a “core political institution” in the 
concurrence, however, has some resonance with the use of the term 
“constitutional architecture” in the Senate Reference. The implication is 
that a change to the electoral system could be held to alter the 
constitutional architecture and, therefore, trigger Part V, particularly 
given the long-standing and uninterrupted use of FPTP federally.  
3. The Fundamental Nature and Role of the House 
We must also examine whether the “fundamental nature and role” of 
the House would change. A move to MMP or PR would not seem to 
affect its fundamental role. The House would remain the confidence 
chamber, the location from which money bills could be introduced,60 and 
the locus of responsible government. More proportional systems might 
bring about changes, however, that could be seen as shifting its 
fundamental nature and therefore as having constitutional significance, 
including: (1) a move away from exclusive use of single-member 
geographic districts; (2) alterations in the pattern of government 
formation; and (3) redesign of the party system. 
(a) Single-Member, Geographic Districts 
Single-member geographic districts are central to FPTP. Other 
systems may use districts, but usually in combination with MPs elected 
from lists, as in MMP, or in large multi-member districts, as with the 
single transferable vote (“STV”). A legislative body composed entirely 
of representatives with a direct electoral link to a particular geographic 
community distinguishes FPTP from list-PR and MMP, and its use of 
single-member districts from STV and some versions of MMP.  
The courts have emphasized the centrality of geographic ridings to 
the right to vote. In Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj,61 the Court understood it as 
“the right to vote in a specific electoral district”.62 In Henry v. Canada  
 
                                                                                                                                  
60 Constitution Act, 1867, at s. 53. 
61 [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Opitz”]. 
62 Id., at para. 29. 
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(Attorney General),63 the British Columbia Superior Court stated that: 
“… Canadian citizens do not have the right to vote at large or to vote 
anywhere in the country; rather, they have the right to vote in a specific 
electoral district, choosing among various candidates who wish to be the 
Member of Parliament for that district”.64 The courts have seemed to 
give constitutional significance to the practice of electing MPs from 
geographic ridings.  
This emphasis on ridings is echoed in the constitutional provisions 
shaping the initial exercise of democracy immediately after 1867. While 
none of the provisions directly bar the use of non-geographic districts, 
they rely on the particular features of FPTP for their full meaning. The 
Constitution Act, 1867 refers to the number of ridings per province 
(section 37), set out transitional provisions on district boundaries (section 
40), and prepared contingencies if “Seats [are] vacated” (section 41). Section 
40 established the number of ridings to which Ontario, Quebec, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick were each entitled.65 For Ontario, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, it explicitly endorsed geographic districts, 
with each riding tied to a local sub-division such as a county. Section 40 
also instituted the rule that each district shall be “entitled to return One 
Member”. Building on section 40, the First and Second Schedules set out 
the names and in some cases the geographic locations of the electoral 
districts for Ontario and Quebec. As a transitional provision, section 40 
is now considered “spent”.66 It is relevant, however, as a signal of the 
assumption of single-member geographic districts in 1867.  
                                                                                                                                  
63 [2010] B.C.J. No. 798, 7 B.C.L.R. (5th) 70, at para. 139 (B.C.S.C.). 
64 Id., at para. 139, cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Opitz, supra, note 61,  
at para. 29. 
65 Thanks to B. Thomas Hall for drawing my attention to this point. Nova Scotia was 
permitted in s. 40 two representatives for the County of Halifax, which is a rare exception to the use 
of single member districts in Canada. That the United Kingdom historically used multi-member 
districts might factor into an assessment of the constitutionality of STV, which is characterized by 
several representatives from a riding. 
66 The annotated version of s. 40 reads: “Spent. Elections are now provided for by the 
Canada Elections Act … qualifications and disqualifications of members by the Parliament of 
Canada Act ... The right of citizens to vote and hold office is provided for in section 3 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 (citations omitted).” Pilon, supra, note 33 relies on ss. 40-41 to argue that 
Parliament has unilateral constitutional authority. This downplays the transitional and now spent 
nature of ss. 40-41. He also relies on examples of the House debating electoral reform in the 1920s 
and 1930s. His emphasis on these past political practices ignores the transformative shift in both 
Parliamentary authority and constitutional amendment rules imposed in 1982. 
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Electing MPs from lists, rather than constituencies, could be seen to 
undermine the assumption that all representatives would come from ridings. 
Take MPP systems, which involve both ridings and lists. MMP is often said 
to change the behaviour of representatives and the functioning of legislative 
bodies through the creation of “two classes” of MPs.67 There is a robust 
debate in countries with MMP, such as Germany, New Zealand, Scotland 
and Wales, whether MPs elected from party lists provide the same degree of 
service to their constituents68 or operate with the same priorities69 as those 
from districts. Much turns on the details. Lists can be “closed” (set by the 
party), or “open” (influenced by voters), or “dual” (where candidates stand 
both in ridings and on a list).70 Overall, however, there is relatively strong 
evidence that MMP is different from FPTP in terms of how MPs act and 
how the legislative body operates.71 The functioning of the House would 
potentially be reworked in significant ways by a move to MMP.  
(b) Majority Government 
Patterns of government formation under MMP or PR might also reshape 
the nature of the House. Proportional systems increase the likelihood of 
minority and coalition governments.72 By contrast, FPTP tends to generate 
majority government. In preventing false majorities, PR would entail 
transformative change.73 
                                                                                                                                  
67 Leigh J. Ward, “‘Second-Class MPs’? New Zealand’s Adaptation to Mixed-Member 
Parliamentary Representation” (1998) 49:2 Political Science 125; Thomas Carl Lundberg, “Tensions 
Between Constituency and Regional Members of the Scottish Parliament Under Mixed-Member 
Proportional Representation: A Failure of the New Politics” (2014) 67 Parl. Affairs 351; Thomas 
Carl Lundburg, “Second Class Representatives? Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in 
Britain” (2006) 59:1 Parl. Affairs 60. 
68 Werner J. Patzelt, “The Constituency Roles of MPs at the Federal and Länder Levels in 
Germany” (2007) 17:1 Regional and Federal Studies 47. 
69 Martin Battle, “Second-Class Representatives or Work Horses? Committee Assignments 
and Electoral Incentives in the Scottish Parliament” (2011) 64:3 Parl. Affairs 494. 
70 Dual lists, as in Germany, might decrease the tendency to have two classes of MPs: Louis 
Massicotte, “Towards a Mixed-Member Proportional System for Québec?” (2007) 43:4 Representation 251. 
71 Id. This evidence appears less strong for the German case, but more compelling for 
Scotland, Wales and New Zealand. 
72 Minority government happens under FPTP, but it remains less likely than in other 
systems. Justice LeBel recognized this in Figueroa, supra, note 54, at para. 155, citing Heather 
MacIvor, “A Brief Introduction to Electoral Reform” in Henry Milner, ed., Making Every Vote 
Count: Reassessing Canada’s Electoral System (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999), at 29. 
73 Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Inherent and Contingent Factors in Reform Initiation in 
Plurality Systems” in André Blais, ed., “To Keep or to Change First Past the Post? The Politics of 
Electoral Reform” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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There may be constitutional significance to FPTP’s reliable, even if 
not uniform, production of majority governments. Justice LeBel’s 
concurrence in Figueroa is again relevant. An electoral system that 
produces majority governments is not an accident of history, in his 
account, but reflects a conscious preference for a particular kind of 
democratic politics. He ties the prevailing pattern of government formation 
to the broader constitutional order: “Majority government is connected to 
the Canadian tradition of responsible government because a single party 
under a single identifiable leader is accountable for government policy.”74 
The “value of political aggregation”, which defines FPTP and its tendency 
toward majority government in his view, “runs through certain fundamental 
Canadian political institutions”.75 In the Figueroa concurrence, three 
members of the Court imbued the prevalence of majority government with 
constitutional significance. 
(c) Fragmentation in the Party System 
MMP or PR would also result in changes to the party system. While 
multiple parties have been and continue to be represented in Parliament, 
FPTP rewards large brokerage parties that appeal across groups of 
voters. FPTP usually results in two parties alternating political power, 
such as the Liberals and Conservatives.76 Proportional systems are, in 
contrast, characterized by multiple parties competing for power, coming 
in and out of coalitions with one another, and typically appealing to a 
more discrete set of voters than in the brokerage model.  
As with government formation, LeBel J. in Figueroa considered the 
party system to reflect deep-seated constitutional values. He tied the 
presence of brokerage parties, especially their ability to accommodate 
competing interests and to appeal to wide swathes of the population, as 
reflecting a deliberate choice in constitutional design. He held that:  
On the spectrum of democratic political systems, from those that 
represent citizens in a more diverse and fragmented way to those where 
only a small number of mainstream parties has any significant presence 
                                                                                                                                  
74 Figueroa, supra, note 54, at para. 155. 
75 Id., at para. 159. 
76 This is “Duverger’s Law”. See Kenneth Benoit, “Duverger’s Law and the Study of 
Electoral Systems” (2006) 4:1 French Politics 69 for an overview of the now massive literature. See 
Patrick Dunleavy & Rekha Diwakar, “Analyzing Multiparty Competition in Plurality Rule 
Elections” (2013) 19:6 Party Politics 855 for a critique. 
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in the political arena, the Canadian system is towards the latter end of 
the range. This has not come about by accident, but in part as a result of 
the deliberate design of our electoral infrastructure to confer advantages 
on mainstream political movements that are denied to parties on the 
political periphery.77  
I do not intend to say that LeBel J. was right to sing the virtues of 
FPTP with regard to government formation or the party system. The 
Figueroa concurrence signals, however, that some of the very aspects of 
FPTP that reformers critique could conceivably be viewed in a very 
different light by the Court, especially in the context of amendment.  
4. Conclusion  
We do not know the specific federal reform proposal and ambiguity 
remains as to the boundaries of the constitutional architecture and the 
fundamental nature tests. The electoral system itself, its exclusive use of 
geographic districts, the specific results that it reliably generates such as 
majority government, or the patterns of party competition that it encourages 
may all have constitutional significance. None of these features of 
Canadian democracy are specifically required by the constitutional text, 
yet all could potentially be interpreted as affecting the fundamental 
nature of the House.  
V. WHICH AMENDING PROCEDURE APPLIES? 
If electoral reform is judged to change the constitutional architecture 
or the fundamental nature of the House, then the rules on amendment in 
Part V apply. The options within Part V are unilateral amendment  
by Parliament pursuant to section 44, provincial agreement on the 7/50 
formula as required by section 38 as the default rule, or even unanimous 
consent under section 41. The prospects for electoral reform vary 
dramatically depending on whether Parliament can act alone.78 The key 
consideration here, on the terms of debate established by the Senate 
Reference, is whether provincial interests on the stakeholder definition 
are engaged. 
                                                                                                                                  
77 Figueroa, supra, note 54, at para. 153. 
78 There is no practical difference if 7/50 or unanimity is imposed. Either rule likely sets an 
unattainable standard. I do not consider unanimity for reasons of space. 
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1. Provincial Interests and the Scope of Section 44: The Relevance 
of Seat Redistribution  
A constitutional challenge to a new electoral system would oblige 
the Court to address the significance of the main prior use of section 44, 
which has been for amending the formula assigning seats in the House to 
each province. One could view the application of section 44 over seat 
redistribution in 1985 and 2011 as a clear signal of federal authority to 
unilaterally remake the House. Adopting PR would be a larger 
modification than seat redistribution, but the difference may only be in 
degree rather than kind, as both relate to representation.  
Reliance on unilateral authority over redistribution as the hook to 
catch electoral reform within section 44, however, faces several 
problems. First, the Senate Reference may simply have changed the 
game by interpreting section 44 as embodying less substance than 
previously assumed. I have argued elsewhere that the Senate Reference 
unfortunately raises doubts as to the constitutionality of even unilateral 
federal control over the redistribution of seats.79 Requiring provincial 
consent to update the distribution of seats would be disastrous,80 yet is 
now a real possibility.  
The only solid judicial endorsement of section 44 for seat redistribution 
comes from the British Columbia Court of Appeal (B.C.C.A.) in 
Campbell v. Canada (Attorney General).81 Campbell involved a 
constitutional challenge to the 1985 federal legislation apportioning seats 
in the House for not garnering provincial consent. The B.C.C.A. upheld 
the legislation as validly enacted through section 44. It held that as long 
as the proportionate representation of the provinces (section 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867) remains undisturbed, Parliament has the 
authority to redistribute seats.  
The interpretation of section 44 in the Senate Reference appears to be 
directly at odds with Campbell. The B.C.C.A. understood section 44 not 
as an exception, but as the default procedure for seat redistribution even 
if there was an obvious impact on provincial representation in Ottawa. 
Campbell assumes section 44 to be subject only to the express textual 
limitation in section 52. The Senate Reference by contrast rejects any 
                                                                                                                                  
79 On s. 44 in relation to seat redistribution, see Michael Pal, “Fair Representation in the 
House of Commons?” (2015) J.P.P.L. 35, at 43-49 [hereinafter “Pal, ‘Fair Representation’”]. 
80 Id., at 47-48. 
81 Supra, note 51. 
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notion of section 44 as the default with regard to the Senate or, by 
extension, the House. Even if Parliamentary amendment of the representation 
formula seemed on solid constitutional ground in the past, that may no 
longer be the case.  
Second, the redistribution of seats pursuant to section 44 has always 
been contested, with heated federal-provincial conflicts whenever the 
representation formula has been revised.82 The formula was modified 
wholesale on four occasions (1946, 1974, 1985 and 2011), with smaller 
variances at other junctures (1915 and 1951). Provinces standing to lose 
seats or influence have fought back by seeking amendments to the 
formula.83 The constitutional rules setting a minimum floor on the 
representation of each province reflect the history of extensive 
negotiations.84 The most recent battle was around the Fair Representation 
Act, which added 30 seats to the House in 2011. It brought the infamous 
claim from a federal Minister that the Premier of Ontario was “the small 
man of Confederation” for objecting to his province’s allocation.85 The 
specter of a constitutional challenge to Parliament’s authority provided 
impetus for the federal government to augment Ontario’s seat total.86 
Provincial representation in the House has also been a repeated  
point of concern in mega-constitutional negotiations. The 1982 reforms 
made the Senate floor rule subject to the unanimous consent requirement 
as one of the items of greatest importance to the provinces. Provincial 
representation in the House had a key place in the Charlottetown 
Accord.87 The Accord would have redistributed seats immediately, but 
also explicitly provided for further inter-governmental negotiations, not 
                                                                                                                                  
82 Peter Oliver describes one such conflict in “Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional 
Amendment” (1999) 49 U.T.L.J. 519, at 533-34. 
83 John Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), at 155-56 [hereinafter “Courtney, 
‘Commissioned Ridings’”]; Elections Canada, ‘History of the Right to Vote’, supra, note 2; Norman 
Ward, “The Basis of Representation in the House of Commons” (1949) 15:4 C.J.E.P.S. 477, at 477. 
84 Courtney, “Commissioned Ridings”, id., at 249. 
85 Keith Leslie, “Van Loan Belittles McGuinty in MP Dispute”, The Toronto Star, 
November 20, 2007. 
86 Brian Laghi, “Ontario Mulls Legal Action, Sources Say”, The Globe and Mail (May 24, 2007). 
87 See Pal, “Fair Representation”, supra, note 79, at 40; Gerald A. Beaudoin, “The 
Charlottetown Accord and Central Institutions” in Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick J. Monahan, eds., 
The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), at 34; and Ronald L. Watts, “The Reform of Federal Institutions” in 
McRoberts & Monahan. 
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unilateral federal action, on setting a “permanent formula” for allocating 
provincial representation.88  
Representation in the House has traditionally also been one of 
Quebec’s key concerns. The various formulas over the years have often 
taken Quebec’s allotment of seats as the starting point in recognition of 
this interest.89 A long-standing demand from Quebec has been a seat 
complement of 25 per cent of the House, regardless of the province’s 
population,90 which was also in the Accord.  
None of this history conclusively establishes the boundaries of 
section 44. The Senate Reference, however, encourages an investigation 
into what aspects of federal institutions the provinces may have a stake in 
preserving. It is therefore notable that the various actors have frequently 
understood redistribution of seats as engaging provincial concerns and 
that unilateral federal authority has been regularly contested. Parliament’s 
previous authority over seat redistribution is not a definitive response to 
concerns about the constitutionality of unilateral federal electoral reform.  
2. Provincial Interests and Minimum Representation 
In addition to ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of section 44, 
electoral reform may tread on provincial interests because of its impact 
on current constitutional provisions on representation. The representation 
formula itself, the Senate floor rule and the grandfather clause establish a 
floor for provincial representation. These guarantees potentially have  
a broader meaning than simply creating a minimum number of MPs  
for each province. 
Take the Senate floor rule. It provides Prince Edward Island with 
four MPs in perpetuity. Under MMP, two of these MPs could be elected 
from constituencies and two from a list. If the list is a closed one, which 
the national parties control, the influence of Islanders might wane. If list 
MPs are less accountable to or less interested in serving their constituents, 
which we have evidence about from other democracies, then the Senate 
floor would not provide the same guarantee of local representation under 
MMP as it would under FPTP. An open list system would address some 
of these concerns.  
                                                                                                                                  
88 Id. 
89 Courtney, “Commissioned Ridings”, supra, note 83, at 23-27. 
90 Russell, supra, note 8, at 226; Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada (Montreal:  
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), at 174-75. 
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A province’s number of MPs is also directly related to its 
representation in Cabinet.91 If list MPs are seen as less legitimate in the 
popular mind, then they may not be appointed to Cabinet in the same 
frequency as their constituency-based colleagues. Modifying the meaning 
of the seat guarantees could be said to involve provincial interests because 
of the impact on local control or cabinet representation.  
While FPTP is not set out in the constitutional text, the minimum 
guarantees of representation arguably assume its presence, and electoral 
reform could therefore be said to trammel on the protections they were 
intended to provide to the provinces. This analysis implies that even if 
the number of seats per province is kept constant in the move from FPTP 
to a more proportional system, provincial interests may still be affected 
under the stakeholder definition adopted by the Court. 
3. Is There a Way Forward? The Ranked Ballot 
Parliament is in a peculiar kind of trap. A transformative reform 
proposal is likely to please reformers and would meet the platform 
commitment. The more ambitious the proposal, however, the greater is 
the resulting constitutional jeopardy. Adopting MMP or PR would force 
a head-on constitutional confrontation between the Court’s emphasis on 
the provincial stake in federal institutions and the legitimate desire  
for reform.  
Of the plausible options, the ranked ballot92 stands as the most likely 
to be within Parliament’s unilateral authority,93 if adopted to complement 
FPTP rather than as part of a more wholesale change to STV. The 
constitutionality of unilateral federal imposition of a ranked ballot turns 
on what scope section 44 possesses, in its attenuated form post-Senate 
Reference. The ranked ballot is less likely to be seen as a change to the 
constitutional architecture or as affecting the fundamental nature of the 
House, because it is not as transformative a reform as PR.  
                                                                                                                                  
91 John Courtney, Elections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), at 53 and Courtney, 
“Commissioned Ridings”, supra, note 83, at 33. 
92 It is also known as Instant Run-Off Voting (“IRV”), the preferential ballot, or the 
alternative vote. 
93 Some Western provinces used ranked ballots for provincial elections, but the practice 
ended in the 1950s. Municipalities in Ontario can opt to use a ranked ballot system: Municipal 
Elections Modernization Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c. 15, s. 30. 
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A ranked ballot allows voters to list in their desired order the 
candidates on offer. The one with the least support is eliminated and her 
supporters’ second choice preferences are counted, and so on, until one 
individual receives more than 50 per cent support. At the level of the voter, 
a ranked ballot changes how ballots are tallied to facilitate the expression 
of multiple preferences. It may also decrease strategic voting, or at least 
make it more nuanced, as a voter can rank their preferred but likely to lose 
candidate first, and a candidate more likely to be elected second.  
At the level of parties, a ranked ballot would likely spur changes, but 
short of those that would accompany PR. A ranked ballot is not a 
proportional system and there would be no direct translation between 
votes for a party and its seats. Parties may have less incentive to engage 
in negative advertising, if they must rely on the second choice 
preferences of the supporters of their opponents, as they may fear turning 
off individuals who might otherwise rank them highly.94 A ranked ballot 
is sometimes said to favour centrist parties that are the second preference 
of many voters.95 The evidence does not suggest, however, that a ranked 
ballot would herald the same transformative changes as MMP or PR.  
A ranked ballot would preserve the elements of FPTP that may be part 
of the constitutional order under the approach set out in the Senate 
Reference. Single-member, geographic ridings would remain in place. 
There is no evidence that ranked ballot systems would facilitate minority 
government or a more fragmented party system. It would not create “two 
classes” of MPs or shift the meaning of the guarantees of representation of 
the provinces. Critics of the ranked ballot highlight its failure to achieve 
proportionality as a fatal flaw. Perhaps ironically, it is the limited nature of 
the reform that may ensure the constitutionality of the ranked ballot. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an ideal world, federal adoption of MMP, PR, STV, or the ranked 
ballot would fall within the constitutional authority of Parliament 
                                                                                                                                  
94 Robert Richie, “Instant Runoff Voting: What Mexico (and Others) Could Learn” 
(2004) 3(3) Election Law Journal 501, at 507; but see also Michael Lewyn, “Two Cheers for 
Instant Run-Off Voting” (2012) 6 Phoenix L. Rev. 117, at 127-30 which frames this claim as less 
certain. 
95 See Éric Grenier, who calculated that the Liberal Party would have won even more  
seats under a ranked ballot in 2015: “Change to Preferential Ballot Would Benefit Liberals”, 
CBC.ca, November 26, 2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/grenier-preferential-ballot-
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398 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
pursuant to its power in section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The 
Supreme Court’s interpretive method in the Senate Reference, in 
combination with the contested prior uses of section 44 and previous 
judicial pronouncements on the electoral system, however, collectively 
suggest that reform exists in a constitutional grey zone. If the federal 
proposal involves PR or even MMP, then there is significant constitutional 
jeopardy at play. The ranked ballot is on more stable constitutional 
ground. The Senate Reference has created significant uncertainty for the 
reform of federal institutions. Further guidance from the Supreme Court 
will likely be necessary to un-muddy the waters. 
